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FEDERAL COURTS TAKE THE WHEEL: THE DELAWARE SUPREME
COURT VALIDATES FEDERAL FORUM PROVISIONS FOR ‘33 ACT
LITIGATION IN SALZBERG V. SCIABACUCCHI
BRITTANY MANN*
I. STARTING

ENGINES: INTRODUCTION
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

THE

TO

FFPS

IN

U.S. corporations are subject to regulation at two primary levels: federal securities law and state corporate law, most commonly that of Delaware.1 While federal securities law is generally focused on regulating
disclosures related to securities and trading of securities, like stock in publicly held companies, state corporate law generally aims to regulate the
internal affairs of the corporation, though they are often not mutually exclusive.2 Accordingly, the line between these two bodies of law is often
fuzzy and distinguishing between their overlapping authorities is complex.3 Inherently though, state law must accede to federal authority when
Congress chooses to institute corporate law.4
* J.D. Candidate, 2023, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2018, Dartmouth College. I would like to thank my parents for their constant
support and understanding throughout this year. I would also like to thank my
Villanova Law Review colleagues for their encouraging feedback and diligent
assistance throughout the process.
1. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 610 (2003)
(“We clearly have two major regulators of the large corporation in the United
States: state corporate law and federal securities law.”); B. John Torabi, The Cyan
Decision and its Impact on State-Level Securities Class Actions, 26 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 253, 255 (2021) (summarizing the federal and state presence in securities
regulation).
2. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1608 (2005) (pointing out the overlap of
Delaware and federal corporate law as to a public company’s disclosure requirements); Roe, supra note 1, at 615–16 (“[T]he formal division of authority is said to
be that the SEC forces disclosure and regulates stock trading while the states handle the internal affairs of shareholder-director relations . . . .”).
3. See Roe, supra note 1, at 610 (“Commentators regularly point to [federal
securities law and state corporate law’s] overlapping authority and the conflicts
between their two bodies of regulation, and courts sometimes try to clarify the
boundaries between them.”); Torabi, supra note 1, at 255 (explaining the “substantial overlapping authority and complex interaction” of state and federal law in securities regulation).
4. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1578 (“There is little constitutional
doubt that, if Congress wished to enact a national corporate law that would displace all state corporate law, it could do so pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause.” (citing Roe, supra note 1, at 607–20)). But see STEPHEN M.

(613)
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Meanwhile, the internal affairs doctrine is a product of state law and is
applied to determine which law applies to state corporate law controversies.5 This doctrine dictates that the internal matters of a corporation will
be governed by the law of the state of incorporation, barring the rare scenario in which it is found another state has a more significant interest.6
Accordingly, the doctrine establishes stability in the expectations of which
state law corporations and their affiliates are subject to.7 In addition, the
consistent application of the internal affairs doctrine is particularly vital to
Delaware maintaining its prominent position at the helm of corporate
law.8
However, in the federal context, the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933
Act) produces a converse effect to the expectations of corporate directors
and shareholders.9 The 1933 Act expressly permits plaintiffs to bring a
cause of action challenging a corporation’s compliance with securities regulation requirements in federal court or state court—wherein different
procedural rules often apply and threaten not only different outcomes but
also duplicative litigation costs for corporate defendants.10 To address
BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 12 (4th ed. 2021) (“The U.S. Supreme
Court has held repeatedly that the federal securities laws do not preempt state
corporate law, but instead place only a limited gloss on the broader body of state
law.”).
5. See 9 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 4223.50 (2021) [hereinafter FLETCHER] (“The
internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle recognizing that only one
state should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs, because
otherwise, a corporation might be faced with conflicting demands.”). See McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 215 (Del. 1987); Rogers v. Guar. Trust Co. of
N.Y., 288 U.S. 123 (1933); In re First Interstate Bancorp Consol. S’holder Litig.,
729 A.2d 851, 865 (Del. Ch. 1998).
6. See FLETCHER, supra note 5 (“[The] internal matters of corporate governance are governed by the law of the state of incorporation, except in the unusual
case where application of the law of another state is required due to an overriding
interest of that other state in the issue to be decided.” (footnotes omitted)).
7. See id. (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 720 N.W.2d 20 (Neb. 2006) (explaining
how the internal affairs doctrine provides predictability in state corporate law that
assures the expectations of those with interests in the corporation)).
8. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 1 TREATISE ON THE L. OF CORPS.
§ 2:13 (3d ed. 2021) (commenting that the internal affair doctrine not only created Delaware’s “dominant body of corporate law principles” but it also continues
to feed into the success of the state in attracting corporate charters); see also Kahan
& Rock, supra note 2, at 1616 (explaining that if Delaware attempts to expand its
scope of authority outside of the internal affairs of a corporation, other states may
counter by expanding the scope of their own).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2018) (allowing filing in both state and federal
court); cf. Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi & Ofer Eldar, Federal Forum Provisions
and the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 383, 390 (2020) (“Congress
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (‘PSLRA’), which imposed
many restrictions on securities class actions brought in federal courts.” (footnote
omitted)).
10. See Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 390 (noting “federal and state
courts have had concurrent jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims” (citing 14 U.S.C.
§ 77v(a) (2018))); see also Mark J. Loewenstein, Pushing the Envelope: Salzberg v.
Sciabacucchi and Delaware’s Evolving View of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 48 NO. 3
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these issues, corporations began adopting provisions in their corporate
governance documents, commonly referred to as federal forum provisions
(FFPs), mandating that all claims filed against the corporation and its affiliates under the 1933 Act be brought exclusively in federal courts.11
Unsurprisingly, these FFPs did not sit well among plaintiffs’ advocates
in securities actions, making it likely that there would be a challenge to
their validity.12 That moment arose with Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi,13 which
came before the Delaware Supreme Court in 2018, on appeal from the
Court of Chancery.14 In Salzberg, the Delaware Supreme Court was tasked
with determining the facial validity of FFPs adopted into a corporation’s
charter that purport to govern claims filed under the 1933 Act against the
corporation and its affiliates.15
This Note analyzes the Delaware Supreme Court’s facial application
of Section 102(b)(1) of the Delaware General Corporate Law (the DGCL)
to charter-based FFPs seeking to govern claims brought under the 1933
Act against a corporation and its affiliates in Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi.16 In
Salzberg, the court held that these FFPs were valid under the DGCL and
federal law, thus enforceable.17 This Note argues that, while the Delaware
Supreme Court’s decision is not binding on other states and may be
viewed as the court exceeding its jurisdiction and betraying legislative intent, it ultimately confers a useful tool on corporations to provide meaningful stability for themselves and their affiliates.18 In turn, this stability
ultimately provides benefits not only to corporations themselves, but also
to their stockholders.19
SEC. REGUL. L.J. 182, 183 (2020) (commenting that the Supreme Court holding
that plaintiffs maintain the ability to file in both state and federal court was followed by “a chaotic and, in some cases, an unmanageable situation for corporate
defendants”); Torabi, supra note 1, at 272 (summarizing the after-effects of the
Supreme Court case that confirmed concurrent jurisdictional nature of the 1933
Act). For further discussion on differences between filing in federal and state
court, see infra Section II.C.
11. See Daniel B. Listwa & Bradley J. Polivka, First Principles for Forum Provisions,
2019 CARDOZO L. REV. DE-NOVO 106, 110 (2019) (“Forum-selection provisions of
various kinds have quickly become familiar tools for corporations seeking to
counteract potentially abusive shareholder litigation.”).
12. See, e.g., id. at 111 (commenting that, with the growth in FFPs, it “was only
a matter of time before they, too, were tested”).
13. 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020).
14. See id. at 109 (addressing a facial challenge to FFPs when placed in a Delaware corporation’s charter).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 137–38.
18. For an explanation of how the Delaware Supreme Court may have overstepped, see infra Section V.A–B. For an explanation as to how the decision provides a useful tool for corporations, see infra Section VI.C.
19. For an argument that the Delaware Supreme Court’s validation of FFPs
will provide benefits to both corporate defendants and shareholders, see infra Section VI.C.
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Part II of this Note summarizes the vacillating history of the procedural landscape for claims under the 1933 Act and the seemingly irrelevant,
though extremely pivotal, Delaware case law that speaks to the scope of
the subject matter of corporate governance documents.20 Part III provides the factual background and procedural history of Salzberg, including
the analysis employed by the Court of Chancery.21 Part IV describes the
reasoning behind the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision.22 Part V critically analyzes the Delaware Supreme Court’s reasoning and argues that,
while certain aspects of the legislature’s intent could have been larger considerations in the analysis, the court’s interpretation was correct, and an
important overall Delaware and federal public policy goal was advanced.23
Finally, Part VI contemplates the likelihood of certain consequences and
benefits of the decision on corporations and their affiliates and federal
securities litigation.24
II. FORMING LANES: BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION &
STATE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Almost ninety years ago, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933
to be a mechanism for re-instilling confidence in the U.S. federal securities market.25 The 1933 Act was pivotal, not only because it provided a
private right of action for securities investors to enforce regulation requirements, but also because it granted petitioners the ability to file claims
in both federal and state courts.26 However, an opinion emerged that
some investors were abusing the power afforded to them under the 1933
Act, causing courts to become overcrowded with frivolous litigation often
fueled by plaintiff’s counsel.27 In response, in 1995 Congress adopted the
20. For a summary of the procedural landscape for claims under the 1933
Act, see infra notes 25–51 and accompanying text. For a summary of the scope of
subject matter allowable in corporate governance document in Delaware, see infra
notes 52–74 and accompanying text.
21. For a summary of the factual background and procedural history of Salzberg, see infra notes 75–109 and accompanying text.
22. For a summary of the Delaware Supreme Court’s reasoning in Salzberg, see
infra notes 110–148 and accompanying text.
23. For a critical analysis of the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Salzberg,
see infra notes 149–191 and accompanying text.
24. For a summary of the impact of the Salzberg decision, see infra notes
192–223 and accompanying text.
25. See Torabi, supra note 1, at 257 (stating the goal of this Act, along with the
1934 Act, was to “restor[e] the confidence of the investing public” in the wake of
the 1929 market crash).
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2018) (“The district courts of the United States
and the United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction . . . concurrent with State and Territorial courts.”); see also Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emp.
Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2018) (commenting that in order to assist with
the enforcement of regulation requirements under the 1933 Act, Congress enabled a private right of action).
27. See Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 390 (commenting on congressional concern toward “the abundance of frivolous lawsuits brought by plaintiffs’
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Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which placed procedural impediments in front of the plaintiffs bringing these securities
claims.28 To avoid most of the obstacles created by the PSLRA, plaintiffs
often chose to file their 1933 Act claims in state court rather than in federal court.29 Accordingly, the concern for corporations’ litigation costs
began to grow and, as a result, more corporations began adopting FFPs
into their corporate governance documents to require any 1933 Act claims
brought against the corporation be brought exclusively in federal courts.30
Meanwhile, Delaware state courts were dealing with an influx of challenges toward modern private ordering tactics being adopted in corporate
governance documents for the purpose of limiting shareholder litigation
power.31 While seemingly irrelevant, Salzberg shows the convergence of
these federal regulation and corporate governance developments.32 In order to appreciate the controversy at the center of Salzberg, it is necessary to
look almost ninety years back to the significant legislation adopted just
after the Great Depression.33

lawyers in the hope of extracting settlements for meritless but expensive claims”);
Listwa & Polivka, supra note 11, at 109 (describing the concurrent jurisdiction for
1933 Act claims and commenting on how “[i]t was not long . . . before concern
over abuse of these causes of action arose”).
28. See Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1066 (“Congress passed [the PSLRA] principally to
stem ‘perceived abuses of the class-action vehicle in litigation involving nationally
traded securities.’ ” (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit,
547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006))).
29. See id. at 1067 (“Rather than face the obstacles set in their path by the
Reform Act, plaintiffs and their representatives began bringing class actions under
state law.” (quoting Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82)). But see Torabi, supra note 1, at 264
(recognizing that “some commentators argue that there is little empirical evidence
to support that such a venue shift actually took place on a significant scale”).
30. See Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1067 (indicating Congress’ intent to combat this
circumvention of the PSLRA). Further amendments to the 1933 Act were adopted
in an effort to prevent this avoidance of the 1933 Act, but it only partially corrected
the issue. For further discussion, see infra Section II.B. See Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718, at 6* (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2018) (“In an
effort to lock in their preferred forum . . . corporations began adopting forumselection provisions that identified the federal courts as the exclusive forum for the
1933 Act claims.”), rev’d, Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020).
31. See generally ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555
(Del. 2014) (holding fee-shifting provisions in non-stock corporation’s bylaws are
valid under the DGCL); Boilermakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73
A.3d 934, 937–38 (Del. Ch. 2013) (holding that forum-selection provisions in bylaws are valid under the DGCL).
32. For discussion on the convergence of these two areas in the Salzberg case,
see infra Part III.
33. See Sciabacucchi, 2018 WL 6719718, at *8 (“A basic understanding of the
1933 Act provides essential context.”); see also Listwa & Polivka, supra note 11, at
108 (“An understanding of the current debate over federal forum-selection clauses
is impossible without an appreciation of the procedural landscape of federal securities law.”).
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The Securities Act of 1933

This is, of course, referencing the adoption of the Securities Act of
1933.34 Following the Wall Street Crash of 1929, Congress adopted the
1933 Act with two primary aims: (i) to keep investors informed and protected against fraud in the sale of securities and thus restore investors’
confidence in the securities market; and (ii) to ensure the marketability of
securities when free of corruption.35
The 1933 Act right of action follows if the registration statement “contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading.”36 Among other matters, the 1933 Act addressed
a niche issue whereby an investor would buy stock from a corporation after
a promoter had, prior to the public offering, executed a transaction with
the corporation which ultimately cheapened the value of the stock in the
offering.37 In this scenario, the investor lacked standing to sue for the
promoter’s actions not being disclosed because the transaction occurred
prior to the purchase of the investor’s stock.38 The 1933 Act addressed

34. See Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Nomura Hldg. Am., Inc., 873 F.3d 85, 96 (2d
Cir. 2017) (“In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress took measures to protect the U.S. economy from suffering another catastrophic collapse. Congress’s
first step in that endeavor was the Securities Act of 1933.”); see also Aggarwal, Choi
& Eldar, supra note 9, at 389–90 (explaining the major securities statutes filed after
the Great Depression are the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Act of
1934).
35. LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 5 (7th ed. 2020) (noting the purpose of the adoption of the 1933
Act was: (i) to “inform the investor of the facts concerning securities offered for
sale and to protect him against fraud and misrepresentation,” and (ii) “to protect
honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation, against the competition
afforded by dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked promotion”
(quoting S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933))).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2018).
37. See RICHARD A. BOOTH, FINANCING THE CORPORATION, § 4.2 (2020) (explaining how the interested promoter issue was resolved by the 1933 Act). Booth
describes an example, wherein a new stockholder’s stock may have less value in a
corporation due to promoters having “sold themselves stock on the cheap before
selling stock to the general public.” Id. For a full picture of the issue prior to the
enactment of the 1933 Act, compare Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting
Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1908) (holding that under federal law stockholder
was deemed to have assented at the time of purchase), with Old Dominion Copper
Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 89 N.E. 193 (1909) (holding under Massachusetts law that there is a cause of action if the public offering was contemplated at
the time of the prior transaction), aff’d, 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
38. See BOOTH, supra note 37, § 4.2 (explaining that when promoters sell stock
at a more expensive rate in a public offering than to themselves, the “new stockholder has no standing to sue because the corporation is presumed to have assented to the terms on which it sold stock, and the new stockholder is presumed to
have paid a fair price for his stock”).
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this issue by requiring disclosure of any previous issuance of stock to a
promoter in the registration statement.39
Notably, Section 11 of the 1933 Act supplements federal enforcement
of securities disclosure requirements by providing a private right of action
for securities purchasers to directly sue the corporate directors, issuers,
underwriters, and various other persons participating in the issuance of
the registration statement for certain offerings of securities.40 Additionally, the 1933 Act, unlike traditional securities regulations, provides a
lower burden for plaintiffs to establish a right of action, thus making it
easier for cases to survive pre-trial motions.41 Around the early 1990s,
Congress grew concerned with the increase in frivolous securities class actions and the toll on corporations concerned with financing their defenses
to these actions.42
B.

Securities Regulation Reform

Due to the growing concern for overcrowded courts filled with frivolous litigation and ambitious plaintiffs filing securities claims, Congress
adopted the PSLRA in 1995.43 Under the PSLRA, plaintiffs who file a
claim under the 1933 Act in federal courts face various procedural impediments meant to disincentivize frivolous claims, such as a stay of discovery
and an increased number of requirements for lead plaintiffs.44
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2018) (listing the items required to be disclosed in
the registration statement under the 1933 Act; referred to as “Schedule A of the
1933 Act”).
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2018) (stating “any person acquiring such security
(unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or
omission) may, either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction,
sue”); see also Listwa & Polivka, supra note 11, at 109 (noting that the 1933 Act
“provided for concurrent state and federal jurisdiction and barred the removal of
actions brought in state courts”).
41. See Torabi, supra note 1, at 258 (explaining Section 11 of the 1933 Act
does not “require[ ] a showing of scienter or causation, a deliberate watering down
of the traditional common law fraud elements meant to encourage compliance
and enforcement of the law”).
42. See id. at 261 (commenting that Congress became concerned with “excess
of class action suits” following the removal of more procedural hurdles for
plaintiffs).
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4 (2018); see also Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9,
at 390 (“Leading up to the 1990s, Congress became increasingly concerned with
the impact of securities class actions, particularly the abundance of frivolous lawsuits brought by plaintiffs’ lawyers in the hope of extracting settlements for meritless but expensive claims. In response Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (‘PSLRA’).”).
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(3)(B) (2018) (requiring that “all discovery and
other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss”);
see also Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 390 (“[Due to the PSLRA,] a stay
[was] imposed on discovery prior to decisions on motions to dismiss, restrictions
on lead plaintiffs, and potentially higher pleading standards.”).
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Notably, unlike its sister act in 1934, the 1933 Act allows claims to be
brought in both federal and state court.45 In 1998, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) amended the 1933 Act and caused
great uncertainty regarding the 1933 Act’s concurrent jurisdiction.46 The
United States Supreme Court settled this uncertainty, holding that the
concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts over these claims still
stands, despite the adoption of the SLUSA amendments.47 Further, the
United States Supreme Court clarified that a defendant remains unable to
remove these claims once filed in state court.48
C.

Growth of FFP Adoptions

Consequently, to avoid the procedural hurdles introduced by the
PSLRA, many plaintiffs looking to file claims under the 1933 Act began
filing predominately in state courts, in addition to federal courts, often
leading to parallel actions.49 When plaintiffs file in state court, as compared to federal court, they avoid many procedural burdens, including: (i)
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2018) (specifying that the claim can be brought in
“any court of competent jurisdiction”); see also Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note
9, at 390 (“Unlike the 1934 Act, federal and state courts have had concurrent jurisdiction over the 1933 Act claims from the time of its enactment.”).
46. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also
Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 391 (“SLUSA provided for the removal of
state securities law class actions to federal court, and then for their dismissal. However, although the purpose of SLUSA was to bring securities class action back
within the ambit of the federal courts (and thus within the restrictions of the
PSLRA), SLUSA did not address class actions brought solely under the 1933 Act.”
(footnotes omitted)). Until Cyan, there was a federal circuit split regarding the
implications of SLUSA on the jurisdictional and removal restrictions of claims filed
under the 1933 Act. Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL
6719718, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2018) (citing Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Employees Ret. Fund, 138 S.Ct. 1061, 1068–69 (2018)) (“The federal courts split on how
to interpret SLUSA’s changes.”), rev’d, Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del.
2020).
47. See Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1066 (holding that SLUSA did not “strip state courts
of jurisdiction over class actions alleging violations of only the Securities Act of
1933” nor did it “empower defendants to remove such actions from state to federal
court”).
48. Id. at 1078 (“Neither did SLUSA authorize removing such suits from state
to federal court.”).
49. See Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 393 (“Cyan sparked . . . a
dramatic increase in 1933 Act claims filed in state courts, for which there was often
a parallel case brought in federal court against the same defendant based on the
same allegations.”); Torabi, supra note 1, at 273 (noting an increase in state court
filings of Section 11 suits post-Cyan) (citing Michael Klausner, Jason Hegland, Cara
LeVine & Jessica Shin, State Section 11 Litigation in Post-Cyan Environment (Despite
Sciabacucchi), 75 BUS. LAW. 1769, 1775 fig. 1 (2020)); see also CORNERSTONE RSCH.,
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2019 YEAR IN REVIEW 19–25, https://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2019/Cornerstone-Research-SecuritiesClass-Action-Filings-2019-YIR.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2PH-DCHA] (showing the
growth of 1933 Act actions involving parallel filings in both state and federal court
following Cyan).
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a stay of discovery until after the motion to dismiss period, (ii) lead plaintiff assignment requirements, (iii) a defendant’s ability to consolidate
claims, and (iv) the higher pleading standards of federal courts.50 To protect themselves against these multi-forum litigations and lower burdens on
plaintiffs, more corporations responded by adopting FFPs in their charters
and bylaws that direct all 1933 Act claims brought against the corporation
and its affiliates to federal court.51
D.

Boilermakers, ATP, and the 2015 Amendments of the DGCL

While federal courts juggled securities regulation developments, the
Delaware state courts faced challenges to modern developments within
the corporate governance arena.52 In 2013, the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed a facial challenge to forum-selection provisions adopted in
the bylaws of corporations, which required any litigation pertaining to the
internal affairs of the corporation to be brought in Delaware.53 In Boilermakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp.,54 the Court of Chancery held
that these provisions are valid under Section 109(b) of the DGCL, which
governs the contents of bylaws of a corporation in Delaware.55
The Boilermakers court found that “the bylaws only regulate suits
brought by stockholders as stockholders in cases governed by the internal
affairs doctrine.”56 Thus, because these bylaws “establish[ ] . . . procedural
rules for the operation of the corporation,” they plainly fall within the
50. See Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 394–98 (listing the restrictions
on plaintiffs in federal court); Torabi, supra note 1, at 263 (detailing how the
PSLRA made it easier for federal courts to dispose of meritless claims, and generally made it “substantially more difficult for investors to maintain securities class
actions in federal court”). But see id. at 396 n.40 (acknowledging that some states
have chosen to adopt some of the same procedural rules as under the PSLRA, such
as the stay of discovery, removing some advantage to filing in state court over federal court).
51. See Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 111 (Del. 2020) (explaining
that, because corporations prefer to litigate 1933 Act claims in federal court, they
began adopting FFPs for these claims); see also Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note
9, at 390 (“Cyan sparked . . . the proliferation of FFPs, particularly in IPOs.”).
52. See generally ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555
(Del. 2014); Boilermakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del.
Ch. 2013).
53. See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 937–38 (stating that defendant Chevron’s bylaw
required “litigation relating to Chevron’s internal affairs should be conducted in
Delaware,” while defendant FedEx’s bylaw similarly provided “that the forum for
litigation related to FedEx’s internal affairs should be the Delaware Court of Chancery” (emphasis added)).
54. 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
55. See id. at 939 (stating that the bylaws of a corporation “may contain any
provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its right or
powers or the right or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees”
(quoting DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b))).
56. Id.
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broad grant of authority under Section 109(b).57 This case not only provided a first impression treatment of forum-selection provisions in governance documents in Delaware, but it also served as a primary source of
reasoning relied on by both of the Delaware state courts in their analysis of
the validity of the FFPs.58
In the 2014 case ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund,59 the Delaware Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to the validity of a bylaw-based fee-shifting provision pertaining solely to “intra-corporate”
disputes under the DGCL.60 A corporation unilaterally adopted the provision in question which purported to “shift[ ] attorneys’ fees and costs to
unsuccessful plaintiffs in intra-corporate litigation.”61 The Delaware Supreme Court held that “fee-shifting provisions in a non-stock corporation’s
bylaws can be valid and enforceable under Delaware law.”62 Ultimately,
the Salzberg court utilized ATP to identify an intermediate category for “intra-corporate” claims.63
In 2015, Delaware’s legislature passed the amendments of Sections
102 and 109 of the DGCL and added Section 115, which encompass limits
and grants as to the subject matter of charters and bylaws for Delaware
corporations.64 The amendments to Section 102 and 109, though “not
explicitly overrul[ing] the ATP Tour decision[,]” do “prohibit Delaware
stock corporations from adopting fee-shifting bylaws or certificate of incorporation provisions.”65 On the other hand, Section 115 codifies the Boiler57. Id. (“[The bylaws] plainly relate to the ‘business of the corporation[s],’
the ‘conduct of [their] affairs,’ and regulate the ‘rights or powers of [their]
stockholders.’”).
58. See Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718, at *9
(Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2018) (stating Boilermakers was a “seminal decision on the validity of forum-selection provisions in the corporate contract”), rev’d, Salzberg v.
Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020).
59. 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).
60. See id. at 555 (Del. 2014) (answering four certified questions from the U.S.
District Court of Delaware). Notably, the court only answered questions pertaining to a Delaware non-stock corporation’s bylaw provision. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 555, 558 (holding fee-shifting provisions in bylaws fall within the
statutory limitations under the DGCL and are not prohibited under the common
law).
63. See Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 122–23 (Del. 2020) (rejecting
the Court of Chancery’s interpretation and stating that ATP supports the conclusion that the corporate contract can govern claims outside of state fiduciary duty
claims, specifically pointing to the “repeated use of the phrase ‘intra-corporate
litigation,’ as opposed to the phrase, ‘internal affairs’ claims”).
64. See Act of June 24, 2015, ch. 40, 80 Del. Laws 40, (2015) (codified as
amended in DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102, 109, 115 (West 2020)).
65. Gregory DiCiancia, Note, Limiting Frivolous Shareholder Lawsuits Via FeeShifting Bylaws: A Call for Delaware to Overturn and Revise Its Fee-Shifting Bylaw Statute,
56 B.C. L. REV. 1537, 1563 (2015) (explaining that “the ATP Tour decision is still
applicable to non-stock corporations”); see DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(f) (prohibiting a charter from containing a fee-shifting provision relating to “an internal corporate claim”); see also Solak v. Sarowitz, 153 A.3d 729, 734 (Del. Ch. 2016)
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makers decision by explicitly validating provisions that direct internal
affairs claims to Delaware state courts as the exclusive forum.66 Notably,
Section 115 also defined what would qualify as “internal corporate
claims.”67
E.

The Internal Affairs Doctrine in Delaware

The internal affairs doctrine is the long-standing principle that the
law of the state of incorporation governs issues relating to the internal
affairs of a corporation.68 This doctrine is essential in maintaining the
expectations of corporations, their affiliates, and their shareholders as to
what state corporate law applies to their conduct and, accordingly, what
rights they possess.69 The doctrine entails a unique choice of law analysis
for state corporate law because it does not consider all facts of the transaction, including whether the corporation has maintained sufficient contacts
within the state.70 Rather, the doctrine dictates a strong presumption that
the state of incorporation provides the applicable law on the internal corporate affairs, and this presumption can only be overcome when a rare
“overriding interest” exists in another state.71
(indicating that less than a year after the ATP decision, the 2015 Amendments
were proposed to “prevent the boards of Delaware stock corporations from adopting fee-shifting bylaws” and stating that the purpose was to “limit ATP to its facts”
(citation omitted)).
66. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (“The certificate of incorporation or the
bylaws may require . . . that any or all internal corporate claims shall be brought
solely and exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State.”); see also
Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL2018, 2018 WL 6719718, at *30 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 18, 2018) (commenting that Section 115 codified the Boilermakers decision), rev’d, Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020).
67. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (defining internal corporate claims as
“claims, including claims in the right of the corporation, (i) that are based upon a
violation of a duty by a current or former director or officer or stockholder in such
capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction upon the Court of
Chancery”).
68. See FLETCHER, supra note 5 (summarizing the internal affairs doctrine).
69. See id. (“By providing certainty and predictability, the internal affairs doctrine protects the justified expectations of the parties with interests in the corporation.”); see also Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 418 (“[T]he [internal
affairs] doctrine . . . prospectively inform[s] directors and officers about the law
that will apply to their actions, and inform[s] shareholders about the standards to
which they can hold corporate executives.”). In addition, the internal affairs doctrine has long been seen as representing more than just a choice of law analysis.
See McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 216–17 (Del. 1987) (stating that the
internal affairs doctrine also has “serious” constitutional implications “under due
process, the commerce clause and the full faith and credit clause” by providing
stability as to what laws will apply in any given situation).
70. See 1 AM. L. OF TORTS § 2:23 (2020) (explaining the analysis is different
for actions based in “contracts entered between a corporation and individuals,
torts, and dealings in personal and real property”).
71. See FLETCHER, supra note 5 (explaining the rarity of an “overriding interest” sufficient to overcome the presumption for the state of incorporation, such as:
“[i]n some jurisdictions, a court may apply the forum state’s law even though the
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Because of the internal affairs doctrine, differences among state corporate codes often dictate where a corporation will choose to incorporate.72 Delaware is the most preferred state of incorporation for public
corporations due to the benefits its corporate law confers upon corporations and stockholders.73 To take advantage of the benefits of incorporating in Delaware, corporations rely on the internal affairs doctrine to be
sure they are subject to Delaware law.74 Accordingly, consistent application of the internal affairs doctrine is arguably the entire basis for Delaware’s ability to exist as the primary state of incorporation.75
III. THE INTERSECTION: THE COURT OF CHANCERY FINDS
THE FFPS UNENFORCEABLE
In Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, the petitioner asked the Delaware Court of
Chancery to determine whether the provisions in the charters of three
different corporations, requiring all 1933 Act claims be brought exclusively in federal court, are enforceable under Delaware corporate law.76
The ultimate question in this challenge was whether it is proper under the
DGCL for a corporation’s governance documents to manage claims based
in federal securities law.77 This question was unclear because federal securities law is not traditionally seen as relating to the “internal affairs” of a
Delaware corporation.78
corporation is registered elsewhere if the corporation’s contacts with the forum
state are stronger than its contacts with the state of incorporation” and, in other
jurisdictions, a court may use an approach that analyzes “the states’ policies . . . to
find out which state’s interests would be more impaired by subordinating its policy
to the policy of the other state”).
72. See J. ROBERT BROWN JR., HERBERT B. MAX & STACEY L. BOWERS, RAISING
CAP. PRIVATE PLACEMENT FORMS § 1.01 (3d ed. 2021) (“Variations among corporate
codes may create an incentive to incorporate in a particular jurisdiction.”).
73. For theories as to why Delaware is the preferred state of incorporation for
public corporations, see COX & HAZEN, supra note 8 (listing several reasons as to
why Delaware “remains supreme” in the race for corporate charters, including: the
DGCL “has the largest body of precedent interpreting its provisions;” its law provides certainty; and “Delaware populates its judiciary with those experienced in the
trenches of practicing corporate law”). But see id. (noting there is also a race to the
bottom theory, wherein Delaware draws corporations to incorporate by catering to
management (citing William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974))).
74. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 8 (“[Delaware’s] success is fed by the vitality
of the internal affairs doctrine.”).
75. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1616 (“The continued applicability of
the internal affairs rule is, of course, the life-blood of Delaware.”).
76. See Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718, at *2
(Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2018), rev’d, Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020).
77. See id. at *1 (stating that the question turns on what subject matter a
charter provision can address under the DGCL).
78. See id. (indicating that the answer rests upon whether the subject matter
intending to be governed is a right or relationship established under Delaware
law).
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Factual Background

The nominal defendants in this case were three Delaware corporations: Blue Apron Holdings, Inc., Roku, Inc., and Stitch Fix, Inc. (collectively, the “defendants”).79 Each had recently filed a registration
statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in preparation for their upcoming IPOs.80 In addition, all three defendants had
adopted “charter-based FFPs” prior to filing their registration statements.81 The three FFPs were similar, in that they stated federal courts
“shall be the exclusive forum for the resolution of any complaint asserting
a cause of action arising under the Securities Act of 1933.”82 The plaintiff,
Matthew Sciabacucchi, bought shares in each of the defendants in either
their IPOs or shortly thereafter, under the aforementioned registration
statements.83 Accordingly, the court stated Sciabacucchi had standing to
sue under Section 11, Section 12(a), and possibly Section 12(a)(2) of the
1933 Act.84
On December 29, 2017, Sciabacucchi filed a complaint naming
twenty individuals, including those who had endorsed the registration documents for the defendants and those acting as directors for the defendants subsequent to going public.85 Overall, Sciabacucchi asserted a facial
challenge to FFPs adopted into corporate charters when purporting to
govern claims brought under the 1933 Act.86
79. Id. at *6.
80. See id. (noting each of the defendants had filed its registration statement
at various times in 2017 and subsequently launched an initial public offering).
81. See id. (“Blue Apron adopted a charter-based [FFP] . . . . Roku adopted a
charter-based [FFP] . . . . Stitch Fix adopted a charter-based [FFP].”). The defendants had adopted these provisions into their charters prior to the Cyan decision,
and thus a circuit split still remained over whether the SLUSA would prevent 1933
Act filings in state courts and allow removal. Id. (noting that all three nominal
defendants filed their registration statements in 2017 and had adopted FFPs prior
to their IPOs).
82. Id. (citing Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 15–16) (also stating that “[a]ny person or entity
purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in any security of the Corporation
shall be deemed to have notice of and consented to [this provision]”). Blue
Apron’s provision differed slightly in that its provision specified that the federal
district courts would be the only forum “to the fullest extent permitted by law.” Id.
(citing Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 14).
83. See id. at *7 (noting Sciabacucchi bought shares of common stock under
the registration statements).
84. See id. (“[A]ddress[ing] any material misstatements or omissions in the
registration statements.”); see also id. (“[E]nforc[ing] the 1933 Act’s registration
requirements.”); id. (addressing “a material misstatement or omission in a
prospectus”).
85. See id. The court also notes that the Cyan decision was decided on March
20, 2018—subsequent to the filing of this complaint—confirming that plaintiffs
remained able to sue under the 1933 Act in state court. Id.
86. Id. (acknowledging the petitioner’s request was a facial challenge, thus
was seeking “a declaratory judgment that the FFPs are invalid” under the DGCL).
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The Boilermakers Test and Its Application to 1933 Act Claims

In Sciabacucchi, the Court of Chancery began the analysis by discussing
Boilermakers, which addressed the validity of forum provisions as adopted
into the bylaws of a Delaware corporation.87 There, the Court of Chancery held that the explicit language of Section 109(b) of the DGCL, which
governs the contents of bylaws, permits bylaws to regulate “internal affairs
claims brought by stockholders qua stockholders,” but does not permit
regulating the “external relationships” of the corporation.88 Accordingly,
the Sciabacucchi court summarized Boilermakers as stating that Delaware corporations are authorized to include forum provisions in their bylaws that
solely apply to internal affairs claims.89
Subsequently, the Court of Chancery applied the same logic to Section 102(b)(1) of the DGCL, which governs the contents of charters, finding that the “scope parallels Section 109(b).”90 Thus, the Court of
Chancery concluded, there are two types of matters—“external” or “internal”—and an FFP in a charter is only valid governing solely internal
claims.91 Accordingly, the pivotal determination was whether claims
brought under the 1933 Act constituted “internal affairs” or “external
affairs.”92
After establishing this test, the Court of Chancery succinctly concluded that an action under the 1933 Act would constitute external affairs
of a corporation.93 To justify this distinction, the court pointed to the fact
that petitioners in 1933 Act claims are not yet stockholders of the corporation “[a]t the time the predicate act occurs.”94 As such, the court found a
petitioner’s status as a stockholder is merely “incidental to a claim under
the 1933 Act.”95

87. See id. at *1, 9 (citing Boilermakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp.,
73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013) (summarizing the decision)).
88. Id. at *1 (noting reference specifically to stockholders bringing the claims
in their role as stockholders); id. at *10 (“[The Boilermakers court] had no difficulty
holding that the forum-selection bylaws fell within the scope of Section 109(b).”).
89. See id. at *11 (“Boilermakers thus validated the ability of a corporation to
adopt a forum-selection provision for internal-affairs claims.”).
90. See id. at *1 (noting that the same reasoning applies).
91. See id. (recounting that Section 109(b) only authorizes regulation of internal matters).
92. Id. (“The Boilermakers distinction between internal and external claims answers whether a forum-selection provision can govern claims under the 1933
Act.”).
93. See id. at *18 (finding 1933 Act claims more synonymous with a “tort or
contract claim brought by a third-party plaintiff”).
94. Id. at *17 (“The cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the
ownership of the share, but rather from the purchase of the share.”).
95. Id.
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Impact of the 2015 Amendments and First Principles

The Court of Chancery next explored the impact of the 2015 Amendments of the DGCL, in particular Sections 102, 109, and 115.96 The Court
of Chancery focused initially on Section 115—pointing to the lack of a
prohibition of forum-selection provisions for non-“internal corporate
claims.”97 The court concluded that this was because the drafters had
“recognized that the charter and bylaws can only address internal affairs
claims.”98
The court then focused on the amendments of Section 102 and 109—
which collectively prohibit fee-shifting provisions in both the charter and
the bylaws when “in connection with an internal corporate claim.”99 The
Court of Chancery asserted that the purpose of these amendments was to
wholly prohibit fee-shifting provisions in the charters and bylaws of stock
corporations.100 Accordingly, the court found the failure to address noninternal claims reinforced the conclusion that the charters and bylaws can
only regulate the internal affairs of a corporation.101
The Court of Chancery concluded its analysis by citing “first principles.”102 Referring to the internal affairs doctrine, the court described an
inherent limit placed on a corporation’s governance documents due to
the DGCL’s limited jurisdiction—so as not to violate territorial principles.103 The court explained that the claim “does not arise out of the
corporate contract” between a stockholder and a corporation, and thus
does not involve the internal affairs that the corporate contract can govern.104 Finally, the court stated that, even if securities lawsuits “involve the
business and affairs of the corporation,” it does not automatically “follow
that these matters involve the internal affairs of the corporation.”105 The
Court of Chancery held that because claims brought under the 1933 Act
96. Id. at *14 (noting Section 115 regulates the adoptions of forum-selection
provisions in charters and bylaws).
97. Id. (“Section 115 does not say explicitly that the charter or bylaws cannot
include forum-selection provisions addressing other types of claims.”).
98. Id. (explaining that the “omission comports with the precedent,” and with
the opinions of “[t]wo past presidents and leading members of the Corporation
Law Council”).
99. Id. at *15 (recounting the amended portions of the sections).
100. Id. (“Their overarching policy goal was to ban fee-shifting provisions
from the corporate contract.”).
101. Id. (noting that “[i]f [the drafters] thought that the charter or bylaws
could regulate other types of claims, then the prohibitions would have swept more
broadly”).
102. Id. at *18 (“The same result derives from First Principles.”).
103. See id. at *18–21 (explaining the prerequisite that any authority held by a
corporation is ultimately derived from state corporate law).
104. Id. at *1–2 (“A claim under the 1933 Act does not turn on the rights,
powers, or preferences of the shares, language in the corporation’s charter or bylaws, a provision in the DGCL, or the equitable relationships that flow from the
internal structure of the corporation.”).
105. Id. at *22.
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fall within the external affairs of a corporation, “the nominal defendants
lack authority to use their certificate of incorporation to regulate claims
under the 1933 Act.”106
D.

Effect of the Court of Chancery’s Holding

Overall, this opinion generated a “substantial slowdown in the adoption of these FFPs.”107 It even induced many corporations who had already adopted these FFPs to either issue reports simply stating that the
FFPs will be unenforceable or even reflecting that they plan to amend to
remove the FFPs if the decision is not reversed.108 Some corporations,
though, chose to adopt these same FFPs even after the Court of Chancery
decision, gambling that the decision would be overturned.109 As this Note
will reveal below, it is safe to say these particular corporations made a good
bet. Upon an appeal by the defendants, the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the Court of Chancery’s decision.110
IV. DELAWARE SUPREME COURT GIVES CORPORATIONS

THE

GREEN LIGHT

In Salzberg, the Delaware Supreme Court re-analyzed the validity of
FFPs governing 1933 Act claims but decided to go a different route. While
the Court of Chancery’s analysis focused on the perceived intent of the
DGCL, the Delaware Supreme Court chose to instead focus on the plain
text.111 Straight away, the court’s analysis diverged from that of the Court
of Chancery, finding that 1933 Act claims do fall within the scope of the
statutory grant.112 The court rejected the Court of Chancery’s equation of
the scope of the internal affairs doctrine with the scope of Section
102(b)(1).113 The Delaware Supreme Court determined that corporate
affairs should be categorized on a “continuum,” rather than in a binary
structure.114 Accordingly, 1933 Act claims fall within the intermediate cat106. Id. at *23.
107. Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 394.
108. See id. (“Unsurprisingly . . . the decision led to a substantial slowdown in
the adoption of FFPs, and some companies have even issued a special 8-K to investors in order to inform the market about the invalidity of the provision. In some
cases, companies issuing an 8-K promised to amend their charters or bylaws (as
applicable) if the decision is not reversed by the Delaware Supreme Court.”).
109. See id. (noting Lyft’s adoption of an FFP into its charter “despite the
decision”).
110. See generally Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020).
111. See id. at 113 (explaining the provisions are valid because they fall within
the plain meaning of the statute).
112. See id. at 114 (“An FFP could easily fall within one [of Section
102(b)(1)’s] broad categories.”).
113. See id. at 125 (dismissing the Court of Chancery’s argument that “superimposed the ‘internal affairs’ doctrine onto and narrowed the scope of Section
102(b)(1)[—]contrary to its plain language”).
114. Id. at 130–31 (explaining that “there is a category of matters that is situated on a continuum between the Boilermakers definition of ‘internal affairs’ and its
description of purely ‘external’ claims’ ”).
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egory of “intra-corporate” claims, existing within the corporate contract,
yet outside of the internal affairs.115 Ultimately, the court reversed the
lower court’s ruling and held that these charter-based FFPs are facially
valid and enforceable.116
A.

1933 Act Claims Fall within the Scope of Section 102(b)(1)

In Salzberg, the Delaware Supreme Court chose to focus more on the
statutory language of the DGCL, and began by going directly to the
source—the text of Section 102(b)(1).117 The court began by summarizing the two broad categories that the statute enables charters to govern as:
(i) “any provision for the management of the business and for the conduct
of the affairs of the corporation,” and (ii) “any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors,
and the stockholders, or any class of the stockholders, . . . if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State.”118 Analyzing these two
categories of enablement, the Delaware Supreme Court disagreed with the
Court of Chancery and concluded that “[a]n FFP could easily fall within
either of these broad categories.”119 The court reasoned that, because
1933 Act claims regulate the management of litigation originating from
the “drafting, reviewing, and filing of registration statements by a corporation and its directors,” they are inherently related to the “management of
business” and the “conduct of the affairs of the corporation” as directly
included in 102(b)(1).120
The Delaware Supreme Court then highlighted the benefits that
these FFPs provide to corporations, especially when in the context of the
escalation of 1933 Act claims filed in state court following the Cyan decision.121 The court focused in particular on the inefficiencies and costs
that arise from the inability to remove cases from state court or consoli115. See id. at 131 (concluding that 1933 Act claims are appropriately deemed
intra-corporate claims because they are within the scope of Section 102(b)(1) but
outside of internal affairs claims as defined by Section 115).
116. See id. at 109–12 (holding that FFPs address a proper subject matter
under Section 102(b)(1)).
117. See id. at 113 (“The ‘most important consideration for the court in interpreting the statute is the words the General Assembly used in writing it.’ ” (quoting
Boilermakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73A.3d 934, 950 (Del. Ch.
2013))).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 114.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 114 (“FFPs can provide a corporation with certain efficiencies in
managing the procedural aspects of securities litigation following the United States
Supreme Court’s Decision in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement
Fund.”). For a discussion on the procedural landscape following Cyan see supra
notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
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date cases in state court.122 The Delaware Supreme Court found that, because FFPs allow corporations to consolidate these claims in federal court,
they directly concern the “management of the business” and “the conduct
of the affairs of the corporation.”123
B.

FFPs Do Not Conflict with Delaware Law or Public Policy

Next, the Delaware Supreme Court zeroed in on the limiting phrase
in Section 102: “if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this
State.”124 In order to confirm that the FFPs do not violate any express
laws or public policy of Delaware, the Delaware Supreme Court walked
through the corresponding background to both.125 Ultimately, the court
concluded the FFPs violated neither.126
In regard to the public policy of Delaware, the court explained that
the DGCL is meant to be a “‘broad enabling act which leaves latitude for
substantial private ordering’” and that it is “widely regarded as the most
flexible in the nation because it leaves the parties to the corporate contract . . . with great leeway to structure their relations, subject to relatively
loose statutory constraints.”127 Thus, “as a matter of Delaware public policy,” the FFPs are facially valid because they agree with Delaware’s endorsement of private ordering.128
Next, the Delaware Supreme Court touched on the 2015 Amendments to the DGCL, which the Court of Chancery had interpreted to find
the FFPs invalid.129 Nonetheless, in the Delaware Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 115, it found that the section was only intended to
prohibit the adoption of charter provisions that would completely exclude
Delaware as a forum for internal corporate claims.130 Thus, the FFPs do
122. Id. at 115 (“When parallel state and federal actions are filed, no procedural mechanism is available to consolidate or coordinate multiple suits in state and
federal court.”).
123. Id. In addition, the court also found that by limiting the power of a
shareholder to bring this action in federal court, the provision also relates to the
“defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors and
the shareholders.” Id.
124. Id. (referencing the precise language in the statute).
125. See id. at 115–18 (summarizing the related DGCL provisions and Delaware public policy on forum provisions and private ordering generally).
126. See id.
127. Id. at 116 (quoting Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996)).
128. See id. (finding that because “corporate charters are contracts among a
corporation’s stockholders, stockholder-approved charter amendments are given
greater respect under [Delaware’s] law”); see also id. at 132 (“[F]orum selection
clauses are presumptively valid and enforceable under Delaware law.” (citing Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1146 (Del. 2010))).
129. See id. at 116–17. To review the earlier analysis in the Court of Chancery’s opinion, see notes 96–101 and accompanying text.
130. See id. at 116 (explaining that Section 115 does not prohibit directing
federal claims to federal court).
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not violate this section because they specifically “direct 1933 Act claims
(federal claims) to federal court.”131
The General Assembly’s choice not to amend Section 102(b)(1) was
also notable, according to the Delaware Supreme Court, especially in light
of the language added to Section 102(f) which “prohibits fee-shifting as
against stockholders (of stock corporations) in connection with an ‘internal corporate claim.’”132 Diverging from the Court of Chancery again,
the Delaware Supreme Court interpreted these amendments to imply that
the scope of Section 102(b)(1) is broader than Section 102(f) or Section
115.133 The court rejected the Court of Chancery and Sciabacucchi’s argument that the amendments in the other sections implicated an amendment to Section 102(b)(1), stating that the “argument runs afoul of a
number of well-established principles of statutory construction.”134 The
Delaware Supreme Court also concluded that its holding agreed with both
federal law and public policy regarding FFPs because Delaware law largely
follows federal law on those issues.135
C.

1933 Act Claims Designated as “Intra-Corporate Claims”

At this point in the opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court had established that (a) FFPs governing 1933 Act claims do not fall within the scope
of Section 115’s definition of internal corporate claims and (b) Section
102(b)(1)’s scope authorizes provisions that would govern non-internal
corporate claims in a charter.136 Additionally, both the Court of Chancery
and the Delaware Supreme Court agreed that a Delaware corporation
131. Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
132. Id. (“The 2015 amendment adding Section 102(f) further supports the
view that Section 102(b)(1) remains expansive enough to include FFPs.”).
133. See id. at 118 (comparing the absence of limitation to “internal corporate
claims” in Section 102(b) to the inclusion of the limitation in Section 115, Section
102(f), and Section 109(b)). The Delaware Supreme Court also pointed to Section 202, which concerns the conduct of persons who are not yet shareholders, as
an example of other sections of the DGCL applying more broadly than Section
115. Id. at 129 (“This is supported by the fact that other sections of the DGCL have
an impact on conduct with persons who are not yet stockholders, such as Section
202.”).
134. Id. at 118–19 (noting the principles of statutory interpretation that other
statutes should not be used to interpret a statute that is otherwise “clear and unambiguous” and “statutes should not be superseded or altered by implication unless
there is an irreconcilable conflict.”). The court also employed the canon of statutory construction wherein one should interpret statutes in a way that gives meaning to every word in the statute. Id. Thus, the omission of “internal corporate
claims” in Section 102(b)(1) has a significance in order to give the inclusion of that
same term meaning in the other sections of the DGCL. Id.
135. See id. at 132–33 (stating Delaware public policy as to forum-selection
provisions “follows United States Supreme court precedent . . . which requires the
court to give as much effect as possible to forum-selection clauses, and to ‘only
deny enforcement of them to the limited extent necessary to avoid some fundamentally inequitable result or a result contrary to positive law.’ ” (quoting Boilermakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73A.3d 934, 949 (Del. Ch. 2013))).
136. See supra notes 117–123 and accompanying text.
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does not have the ability to adopt an FFP that would govern external
claims into either its charter or bylaws.137 Thus, according to the Delaware Supreme Court, the only logical conclusion is that there is a category
between internal corporate claims and external claims, wherein there lies
subject matter including claims brought under the 1933 Act.138 The
court, adopting the term used in ATP, named this category intra-corporate
claims.139 The Delaware Supreme Court designated 1933 Act claims
within this category because they “are not governed by substantive Delaware law,” yet are still sufficiently “internal” to the corporation’s affairs as
to fall within Section 102(b)(1).140
The Delaware Supreme Court provided a helpful visual to further illustrate the span of corporate affairs141:

137. See id. at 131 (acknowledging that “there are purely ‘external’ claims . . .
which are clearly outside the bounds of Section 102(b)(1)”); see also Sciabacucchi
v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718, at *18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2018)
(“[A] corporation does not have the power to adopt in its charter or bylaws a
forum-selection provision that governs external claims.”) rev’d, Salzberg v.
Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020). Instead, the disagreement lies in whether
there is a binary division of claims (external/internal) or a continuum. Id.
138. See Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 125 (“There is a category of matters that is situated on a continuum between the Boilermakers definition of ‘internal affairs’ and its
description of purely ‘external’ claims.”).
139. See id. (“ATP suggests that certificate of incorporation provisions governing certain types of ‘intra-corporate’ claims that are not strictly within Boilermakers’ “internal affairs,” can still be within the boundaries of the DGCL, and
specifically Section 102(b)(1).”).
140. Id. at 123–24 (noting that 1933 Act claims still “arise from internal corporate conduct on the part of the Board” and pointing out that because the examples
provided in Boilermakers of “external claims” had “no Board action . . . present as it
necessarily is in Section 11 claims”).
141. See id. at 131 fig. 1 (including the Venn diagram to illustrate the continuum of corporate affairs).
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This visual draws a comparison between the Court of Chancery’s “binary
world,” which consists of only external claims and internal affairs claims,
and the Supreme Court’s “continuum,” which includes a broader scope of
Section 115 internal corporate claims, the “Outer Bound” of strictly Section 102(b)’s intra-corporate affairs claims, and strictly external claims.142
D.

Delaware Supreme Court Acknowledges Potential Responses to the Holding

Ultimately, the court re-emphasized that its obligation on appeal was
only to determine whether an FFP could be valid on its face.143 Accordingly, the court noted that the possibility of a non-stockholder plaintiff
bringing a 1933 Act claim against a corporation is irrelevant to its assessment of the facial validity of these FFPs.144 Nevertheless, the court also
acknowledged that it remains possible that an FFP governing 1933 Act
claims could be found unenforceable in an as-applied challenge.145 Overall, the court listed three “as applied” bases for potentially finding these
FFPs unenforceable: (i) if enforcement would be “unreasonable or unjust;” (ii) if the FFPs involved “fraud or overreaching;” or (iii) if enforcement would contradict “strong public policy of the forum in which suit is
brought.”146
Finally, to conclude its opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged the potential “down the road” effects its decision may have,
particularly the enforceability, or lack thereof, of these FFPs by Delaware’s
“sister states.”147 The court noted that, while the “question of enforceability” is important to consider, it should not be the driver in a challenge of
facial validity.148 Regardless, the court felt compelled to provide reasoning for other states to similarly enforce these FFPs, and did so by parallel142. Id. at 131 (illustrating the court’s understanding of the Court of Chancery’s scope of Section 102(b) as being even narrower than the definition as provided in Section 115, rather than broader as the Supreme Court understands it).
The court also illustrated the Court of Chancery’s shrinking of the concept of
internal affairs, as it is understood by not only the Delaware Supreme Court, but
also the United States Supreme Court. Id. See also id. at 125 (concluding that the
scope of Section 102(b) is broader than Section 115).
143. See id. at 130 (noting the question was whether “an FFP can survive a
facial challenge based upon claims asserted by an existing stockholder”).
144. See id. (finding that it does not matter whether or not 1933 Act claims
“arise from the purchase of shares, as opposed to share ownership” because the
FFPs are valid as to existing stockholders).
145. See id. at 135 (recognizing that “provisions that may otherwise be facially
valid will not be enforced if adopted or used for an inequitable purpose”).
146. Id. at 135 (citing M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15
(1972)).
147. See id. at 133 (acknowledging that “[p]erhaps the most difficult aspect of
this dispute is . . . whether [FFPs] will be respected and enforced by [Delaware’s]
sister states”).
148. See id. at 134 (conceding nonetheless that the enforceability in other
states is a “powerful concern that has infused much of the briefing here”).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

21

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [], Art. 4

634

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67: p. 613

ing the beneficial effects and concerns related to the internal affairs
doctrine to those raised when enforcing these FFPs.149
V.

SWERVING OUT

OF

ITS LANE? CRITICAL ANALYSIS

OF

SALZBERG

While most commentary following Salzberg focused on the potential
negative implications to stockholders, some critics latched on to the
court’s express acknowledgment that its decision may be regarded as an
“out-of-[its]-lane power grab” by “stepping on the toes of . . . the federal
government.”150 Another criticism is that Salzberg did not sufficiently consider Congress’s initial objective for the 1933 Act—protecting investors.151
In addition, some critics found that, though claiming to agree with the
previously existing scope, in reality Salzberg effectively broadened the
boundaries of Section 102(b)(1).152 While each of these criticisms have
strong reasoning, they are incorrect for the reasons stated below.153 This
Part will rebut each of these arguments because Salzberg’s analysis encompasses stronger support and promotes a common policy goal of the 1933
Act and Delaware—improving judicial economy.154 Finally, this Part will
conclude by describing an alternative theory as to how the Delaware Supreme Court could have determined the FFPs were valid under the
DGCL—by directly characterizing 1933 Act claims as internal affairs
claims.155
A.

Federal Legislative Intent

A narrow look into federal law relating to the 1933 Act has led some
critics to conclude that Salzberg neglected the intent of the 1933 Act and
the United States Supreme Court decision in Cyan.156 They point to Congress’s objective—to heighten the regulation of the securities markets by
149. See id. at 135–37 (finding that the Constitutional concerns raised with
enforcement of FFPs, similar to with the internal affairs doctrine, are not violated
because of FFPs “procedural nature” and the “uniformity and predictability” that
they provide).
150. Id. at 134 (commenting that some of the briefs expressed views that the
court’s holding would be beyond its authority).
151. See infra notes 156–160 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 167–172 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 156–181 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 177–181 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 182–192 and accompanying text.
156. See Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 421–22 (“These provisions
have attracted criticism from both academics and practitioners, in large part because they constitute private ordering devices that customizes (and restricts) rights
conferred on shareholders by Congress and interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Cyan.”); see, e.g., BARBARA ROPER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., CAUTION: SLIPPERY
SLOPE: HOW DELAWARE SUPREME COURT’S BLUE APRON DECISION COULD HARM INVESTORS AND UNDERMINE MARKET INTEGRITY 16 (2020) (“The direct and immediate
effect of the Delaware Supreme Court decision was to effectively negate the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Cyan decision.”).
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providing a forum in both federal court and state court.157 These critics
also mention that Cyan reaffirmed this intent by reaffirming the concurrent jurisdiction, with no option for removal even after the adoption of
SLUSA.158 Accordingly, critics claim it follows from Cyan that stockholders’ ability to bring 1933 Act claims in state court can only be removed by
an explicit act of Congress.159 Consequently, these critics argue that Salzberg is “stepping on the toes” of Congress’s intent by allowing corporations
to prevent filings in state court and take away a portion of investors’ broad
enforcement abilities.160
However, these criticisms are incorrect because they fail to account
for federal case law already on point.161 The Delaware Supreme Court
included an analysis of the federal law’s treatment of FFPs, finding a
United States Supreme Court case, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,162 strongly supports “the notion that FFPs do not violate federal
public policy by narrowing the forum alternatives available under the Securities Act.”163 Rodriguez validated the use of FFPs with claims under the
157. See ROPER, supra note 156, at 6 (explaining “Congress recognized the
importance of providing both public and private enforcement mechanisms” to accomplish its enforcement goals).
158. See id. at 16 (“Cyan held that Congress intended to allow investors to
bring such cases in both federal and state court.”); see also Torabi, supra note 1, at
256 (explaining that the Cyan decision was able to “faithfully maintain[ ] the original intent of the 1933 Act” by “preservation of the narrow class of pure 1933 Act
state court class actions”).
159. See ROPER, supra note 156, at 8 (concluding that FFPs “effectively negate
the Cyan ruling”).
160. See id. at 16 n. 31 (“[T]he decision may effectively overturn the flexibility
afforded plaintiffs under the Cyan decision.” (quoting Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Forum Selection Clause Provisions For Securities Act Claims, QUINN EMANUEL TRIAL
LAWS. (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.quinnemanuel.com/the-firm/publications/
Delaware-supreme-court-alert/ [https://perma.cc/8U6B-98EN])). There is also
concern that it may be seen as encroaching into federal securities regulation, and
it may attract further federal regulation. See Loewenstein, supra note 10, at 187
(commenting that “if Delaware corporations are too aggressive in defining the
rights of their shareholders, particularly in the area of federal law, they will invite
federal regulation”); ROPER, supra note 156, at 1 (“[Salzberg] has the potential to
greatly diminish the importance of Delaware corporate law and the state’s
courts.”); see also Torabi, supra note 1, at 255 (“Especially where the safeguards of
state corporate law and internal accounting controls fail . . . investors turn to federal authorities and securities law for relief, not to state corporate law.”). For discussion of further regulations that may be adopted by corporations, see infra notes
196–207 and accompanying text.
161. See Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limits of Delaware Corporate Law: Internal Affairs, Federal Forum Provisions, and Sciabacucchi, 75 BUS. LAW. 1319, 1320 (2019)
(commenting that the Chancery Court analysis was problematic because it “us[ed]
Delaware law to preclude a federal practice in federal court under a federal statute
that is permissible under federal law”).
162. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
163. Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 132 (Del. 2020) (citing Rodriguez,
490 U.S. at 485–86) (summarizing the holding in Rodriguez finding an arbitration
provision in a standard contract that effectively precluded litigation in state court
for Security Act claims was enforceable)).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [], Art. 4

636

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67: p. 613

1933 Act because, in validating an arbitration provision governing 1933
Act claims, the United States Supreme Court equated the provision to “a
specialized kind of forum selection clause.”164 Additionally, Rodriguez supports that there is no absolute right for investors to litigate 1933 Act claims
in state court.165 Rodriguez is more on point for this issue than the supposed implicit holding in Cyan, thus is more persuasive.166
B.

Delaware Legislative Intent

On the state law portion of the analysis, some critics argue that Salzberg effectively expanded Delaware’s internal affairs doctrine beyond its
previous scope.167 These critics find issue in the expansion of the scope of
Section 102(b)(1), and thus the DGCL, beyond the internal affairs of a
corporation.168 Specifically, they argue that the Delaware Supreme
Court’s analysis contradicts the general understanding of the scope of the
subject matter governed by the corporate contract—formed via the
DGCL, the charter, and the bylaws—as limited to those matters within the
internal affairs doctrine.169
As the Court of Chancery cited in its opinion, two past chairs of the
Council of the Delaware State Bar Association’s Corporation Law Section
agreed with the implicit limit under the internal affairs doctrine and further concluded that securities claims fall outside the scope of what can be
governed by the charter and bylaws of a corporation.170 While their opin164. Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 482–83); see also Grundfest, supra note
161, at 1340. But see ROPER, supra note 156, at 14 n.28 (“[T]he Salzberg court did
not recognize the important procedural safeguards that distinguish broker-dealer
arbitration from other types of arbitration.”).
165. See Grundfest, supra note 161, at 1323 (opining that Rodriguez supports
that “there is no immutable right to litigate Securities Act claims in state court”).
166. See id. at 1340 (explaining that, in addition to being supported by federal
precedent, “nothing in the PSLRA, SLUSA, or Cyan limits a forum selection provision from designating a federal court as the venue in which a Securities Act claims
must proceed” (footnotes omitted)).
167. See, e.g., Loewenstein, supra note 10, at 182 (“Although, strictly speaking,
the [c]ourt left this definition untouched, the practical effect of the decision was,
perhaps, to expand the reach of state corporate law by expanding the kinds of
provisions that a corporation may include in its charter and bylaws.”).
168. See ROPER, supra note 156, at 11 (stating explicitly that Salzberg extended
the outer limits of what was previously able to be included in a charter or bylaw).
169. See Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718, at
*14 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2018) (arguing the precedent leading up to the adoption of
Section 115 “recognized that the charter and bylaws can only address internalaffairs claims”), rev’d, Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020).
170. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Norman M. Monhait, Fee Shifting Bylaws:
A Study in Federalism, INST. DEL. CORP. BUS. L. (June 29, 2015), https://
blogs.law.widener.edu/delcorp/2015 /06/29/fee-shifting-bylaws-a-study-in-federalism/#sthash.pe8gY0Tm.dpbs [https://perma.cc/MS5J-8CM2] (concluding that
subsequent to the 2015 Amendments to Section 102(b)(1) and 109(b), the subject
matter of these provisions “does not extend so far as to permit the charter or the
bylaws to create a power to bind stockholders in regard to fee-shifting in, or the
venue for, federal securities class actions” (emphasis added)).
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ion did not necessarily reflect the view of the drafters of the 2015 amendments, it does suggest that it may have been the previous understanding
held by the Council.171 Accordingly, some critics see Salzberg as neglecting
the consensus that charters and bylaws should never be able to govern the
area of matters being termed “intra-corporate.”172
This argument ignores the fact that the DGCL already explicitly governs matters outside the scope of the internal affairs doctrine.173 Section
202 of the DGCL “authorizes charter provisions that impose ‘[r]estrictions
on transfer and ownership of securities.’”174 Notably, Section 202’s restrictions are not limited to existing shareholders by express language or
by implication, thus Section 202 governs transactions outside non-current
stockholders.175 By reading Section 102(b)(1) in pari materia with Section
202 of the DGCL, it must be interpreted that Section 102(b)(1) also is
able to govern the same.176
C.

Public Policy

Ultimately, the Salzberg decision promotes the common public policy
goal of both Delaware corporate law and federal securities law—judicial
efficiency. One of the Delaware Supreme Court’s considerations was facilitating the “predictability, uniformity, and prompt judicial resolution to
171. See id. at n.1 (noting that “Mr. Monhait is the immediate past chair, and
Professor Hamermesh a prior chair and a member, of the Council of the Delaware
State Bar Association’s Corporation Law Section,” however their comments “do
not necessarily represent the views of the Association, the Section, or its Council”).
In addition, former-Justice Strine, also former-Chancellor of the Court of Chancery, had stated that “Delaware corporation law governs only the internal affairs of
the corporation.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and
Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 674 (2005)
(explaining the narrow application of Delaware corporate law by expanding on a
speech the author had given at the European Policy Forum).
172. See Hamermesh & Monhait, supra note 170 (stating that “the subject matter scope of Sections 102(b)(1) and 109(b) is broad,” but “it does not extend so far
as to permit the charter or the bylaws to create a power to bind stockholders in
regard to . . . the venue for[ ] federal securities class actions”).
173. See Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 414 (“Delaware corporate
law, in conjunction with the federal securities laws, also regulated the proxy process.”); see also Grundfest, supra note 161, at 65–66 (arguing that Delaware corporate law already regulates subject matter that technically falls outside of the
internal corporate affairs).
174. Grundfest, supra note 161, at 1372 (citing DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8 § 202(a)
(2019)).
175. See id. at 1373 (“Nowhere is section 202 limited to restraints on existing
stockholders, and the statute’s plain text makes it clear that any such reading is
irrational.”); see id. (explaining that Section 202 denies the Sciabacucchi holding);
see also id. (adding that DGCL sections 152, 157, and 166 also govern transactions
with persons who are not existing security holders).
176. Id. at 1374 (“Any other interpretation forces the illogical conclusion that
Delaware’s legislature intended to permit transfer restrictions under section 202
that it would forbid under section 102 if the identical language had simply been
framed as a less restrictive standard charter provision that imposed no restraint on
alienation.”).
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corporate disputes.”177 These are important policy goals in Delaware.178
In addition, federal public policy—especially for the 1933 Act—promotes
judicial efficiency.179 Parallel actions asserting the same claims “run completely counter to the efficiency rationale of the class action.”180 Thus,
because FFPs improve the “judicial economy” of securities actions by “allow[ing] for consolidation and coordination of such claims to avoid inefficiencies and unnecessary costs,” the Salzberg decision promotes this
common policy goal.181
D.

Alternative Route: The 1933 Act as a Federal Mandate for
State Corporate Law

An alternative theory as to why these FFPs do not violate the DGCL
and the internal affairs doctrine, without requiring a continuum, is that
1933 Act claims are inherently related to matters of the internal affairs of a
corporation.182 As mentioned in Part II above, prior to the 1933 Act, no
mechanism existed for stockholders to sue a corporation or its affiliates
for not disclosing a transaction occurring prior to a public offering between a promoter and the corporation.183 For example, if a promoter
had sold itself stock at a lower price prior to selling to the general public,
thus decreasing the value of the stock to the new stockholders, a new
stockholder would have no redress.184 State corporate law at the time did
177. Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 137 (Del. 2020) (citing Broz v.
Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 159 (Del. 1996) (footnotes omitted)); see also
Carvel v. Andreas Hldgs. Corp., 698 A.2d 375, 379 (Del. Ch. 1995); Cantor Fitzgerald v. Chandler, Nos. 15698-NC, 15690-NC, 1999 WL 1022065, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct.
14, 1999) (commenting on how Delaware law attempts “to achieve judicial economy and avoid duplicative efforts among courts in resolving disputes”).
178. See Broz, 673 A.2d at 159 (“[C]ertainty and predictability are values to be
promoted in [Delaware] corporation law.”); see also Carvel, 698 A.2d at 378–79
(noting Delaware policies are to promote expeditious determinations and uniformity); Cantor Fitzgerald, 1999 WL 1022065, at *4–5 (justifying decision based on
policy in Delaware of “achieving maximum judicial economy and efficiency of effort where substantive due process rights of the parties are not affected”).
179. In the definition section of the 1933 Act, it states for the benefit of future
rule makers that they should consider the efficiency. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2018)
(stating that, when engaging in rulemaking under this subchapter, “the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the
action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation”).
180. James J. Beha II & Steve Rappoport, Will Delaware Sciabacucchi Decision
Limit Multi-Jurisdictional Securities Act Litigation?, WESTLAW J. SEC. LITI. REGUL., May
2020, at 2 (quoting Swierkowki v. Consol. Rail Corp., 168 F.Supp. 2d 389, 395 (E.D.
Pa. 2001)).
181. Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 137.
182. See Richard A. Booth, Oops! The Inherent Ambiguity of Out-of-Pocket Damages
in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 46 J. CORP. L. 319, 340 (2021) (criticizing the reasoning in Salzberg and providing an alternative interpretation for finding 1933 Act
claims within the reach of Section 102).
183. For discussion on the lack of redress for these types of transactions, see
supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
184. See BOOTH, supra note 37, § 4.2.
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not address this issue because, there was “no wrong done” directly to the
stockholder at the transaction in which the new stockholder had purchased the security.185 This limitation was later termed the “contemporaneous ownership rule.”186 The contemporaneous ownership rule is a state
corporate law limitation on derivative actions, sometimes extended to direct actions, that requires stockholders to own stock at the time the wrong
is inflicted in order to have standing.187 The 1933 Act circumvented that
requirement by allowing stockholders to sue despite the claim relating to a
transaction occurring prior to the purchase of the stock.
Accordingly, the 1933 Act is arguably a “federally mandated provision
of state corporation law.”188 It supplements state corporate law by undoing the limitation imposed by the contemporaneous ownership rule by
providing a direct right of action for stockholders to sue if not disclosed by
the corporation.189 In addition, this aspect is evidenced by Congress’s
choice to include concurrent jurisdiction in state court in addition to federal court, indicating intent for these claims to be enforced in the same
manner as state corporate law substantive claims.190 Inherently, 1933 Act
claims are “matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the
corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders.”191 Just
because 1993 Act claims are based in federal law, does not change the
actuality that the substance of these claims regards the same subject matter
as internal affairs claims based in state corporate law.192
185. See, e.g., Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210
U.S. 206, 212 (1908) (reasoning that there is no state fiduciary duty violation because the alleged breach occurred prior to the plaintiff’s purchase of stock).
186. See J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement,
33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 673 (2008) (defining the contemporaneous ownership
requirement as: “if a stockholder-plaintiff does not own stock at the time the wrong
is inflicted on the corporation, the stockholder lacks standing to sue” (citing DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2021))).
187. See id. at 673 n.1 (“Although the statute and rule speak only of derivative
actions, the Delaware Court of Chancery has extended the contemporaneous ownership requirement to plaintiffs asserting direct (as opposed to derivative)
claims.”).
188. Booth, supra note 182, 340 n.76 (describing the 1933 Act as a “federally
mandated provision”).
189. See BOOTH, supra note 37, § 4.2 (explaining that, prior to the 1933 Act,
no mechanism existed for stockholders to sue a corporation or its affiliates for not
disclosing a transaction occurring prior to a public offering between a promoter
and the corporation, and the 1933 Act circumvented the contemporaneous ownership rule to allow stockholders to sue despite the claim relating to a transaction
occurring prior to the purchase of the stock).
190. See Booth, supra note 182, 340 n.76 (“This view of the 1933 Act is quite
consistent with the provision of concurrent jurisdiction therein.”).
191. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (describing the internal
affairs of a corporation).
192. Cf. Booth, supra note 182, 340 n.76 (explaining how the 1933 Act filled
in the gaps in for stockholder standing); BOOTH, supra note 37, § 4.2 (describing
the consistencies between the subject matter in fiduciary duty state law claims and
1933 Act claims).
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VI. EFFECTS DOWN THE ROAD: SALZBERG’S IMPACT
SECURITIES LITIGATION

ON

There was, and still is, significant uncertainty remaining following
Salzberg. First, questions remain unanswered as to whether Salzberg opened
the door to other potentially more restrictive provisions for shareholder
litigation, such as arbitration provisions.193 In addition, one of the most
important questions left open was the treatment of these FFPs by Delaware’s sister states.194 Ultimately, the impact most likely to follow the Salzberg decision will be an escalation in the adoption of FFPs into charters
and bylaws of corporations expecting to commence an offering in the
near future.195 As will be detailed below, the result of this will not only be
of benefit to these corporations and their affiliates, but also their
shareholders.
A.

Salzberg May Open the Door to Broader Restrictions on
Shareholder Litigation

Arguably, the most dominating fear by investor advocates is that the
Salzberg decision will encourage corporations to adopt provisions that restrict shareholder security regulation power against corporations even
more than FFPs do.196 Regardless of whether Salzberg was responsible for
granting the expanded reach of these provisions, it is apparent that the
opinion has at least implicitly shown a broader reach of Delaware state
corporate law than many commentators and courts had previously
thought possible.197 Thus, there is fear that corporations will now take
193. For discussion on how Salzberg may have opened the door to broader
restrictions, see infra notes 196–207 and accompanying text.
194. For discussion on how Salzberg left open the question of how sister states
may treat the FFPs, see infra notes 208–213 and accompanying text.
195. See ROPER, supra note 156, at 16 n.31 (“The explosion of Securities Act
class actions in state court will likely cease as more Delaware corporations adopt
forum selection clause provisions.” (quoting Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Forum
Selection Clause Provisions For Securities Act Claims, QUINN EMANUEL TRIAL LAWS.
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.quinnemanuel.com/the-firm/publications/delaware-supreme-court-alert/ [https://perma.cc/7JDH-V24F])).
196. See Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 415 (commenting that the
possibility of mandatory arbitration provisions and fee-shifting provisions being
adopted to handle 1933 Act disputes may be seen by some as “an unattractive byproduct of an expansive notion of corporate contract”); ROPER, supra note 156, at
16–49 (detailing the various provisions they predict corporations may be able to or
may try to adopt following Salzberg).
197. See Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 121 (Del. 2020) (holding that
the contents of charter provisions and bylaws may govern beyond just “internal
affairs” of a corporation); see also Loewenstein, supra note 10, at 1 (concluding that
despite the explicit re-defining of the internal affairs doctrine, “the practical effect
of the decision was . . . to expand the reach of state corporate law by expanding
the kinds of provisions that a corporation may include in its charter and bylaws”).
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advantage of this revelation and adopt provisions previously thought to be
prohibited within a corporation’s governance documents.198
One particular kind of provision being discussed post-Salzberg is one
that mandates arbitration of all claims brought under the 1933 Act by
shareholders or even mandates individual arbitration.199 The Delaware
Supreme Court attempted to quell this concern by stating in a footnote
that “such provisions, at least from our state law perspective, would violate
Section 115 which provides that, ‘no provision of the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may prohibit bringing such claims in the courts of
this state.’”200 However, Section 115 only invalidates internal corporate
claims, and does not address intra-corporate claims.201 Per Salzberg, 1933
Act claims do not fall within Section 115’s internal corporate claims, thus
there is no explicit restriction of an arbitration provision in the charter or
bylaws under Section 115.202
Nonetheless, many commentators opine that these clauses are likely
to remain invalid under state law.203 One theory is that, in validating
FFPs, the court “expressly preclude[s] arbitration and force[s] litigation
into federal or Delaware state court,” and thus arguing that this decision
198. See ROPER, supra note 156, at 16–17 (“Put simply, the decision creates a
slippery slope, with the potential for its logic to be applied beyond ‘33 Act claims
and to charter and bylaw provisions that address a broader range of issues than
whether claims will be heard in federal or state court.”); see also Delaware Supreme
Court Ruling Allows Exclusive Federal Forum Provisions For ’33 Act Claims, MORGAN
LEWIS (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2020/03/delawaresupreme-court-ruling-allows-exclusive-federal-forum-provisions-for-33-act-claims
[https://perma.cc/9TNA-D9KG] (opining that the Salzberg decision will likely
have “far-reaching implications for the scope of matters subject to private ordering
for Delaware corporations”).
199. See Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 137 n.169 (“Much of the opposition to FFPs
seems to be based upon a concern that if upheld, the ‘next move’ might be forum
provisions that require arbitration of internal corporate claims.”); see also Aggarwal,
Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 414 (noting corporations “may even attempt to
adopt a mandatory, individual arbitration provision for 1933 Act claims.”); see also
ROPER, supra note 156, at 2 (listing an individual arbitration clause among the
types of provisions that may be “force[d] upon shareholders” in the wake of the
Salzberg decision); Delaware Supreme Court Unanimously Upholds Federal-Forum Provisions, GIBSON DUNN (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.gibsondunn.com/delaware-supreme-court-unanimously-upholds-federal-forum-provisions/ [https://perma.cc/
R6KQ-T2RQ] (listing the potential for a “push to include arbitration as an exclusive means to resolve certain intra-corporate disputes lying within the ‘outer
bound’ of Section 102(b)(1)” among the key takeaways of the Salzberg decision).
200. Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 137 n.169 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §115).
201. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §115 (stating that forum selection is permissible
for internal corporate claims and defining the term “internal corporate claims,”
but lacking reference to “intra-corporate” claims).
202. See Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 116–17.
203. See Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 415 (“[A]t least as a matter
of policy, it does not follow that validating FFPs should also lead to validating
mandatory arbitration provisions that can preclude shareholders from filing lawsuits altogether.”).
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invites mandatory arbitration is illogical.204 Another argument points to
the fact that the SEC has never allowed public companies to mandate arbitration and Salzberg’s footnote reaffirms that practice.205 Further, these
advocates claim that a director would not dare try to adopt such a provision for fear that they would be voted out.206 Nevertheless, there are
many other restrictions corporations may now have the opportunity to utilize to reduce shareholder litigation power.207
204. Grundfest, supra note 160, at 1331, 1385 (“It stands logic on its head to
argue that a provision that prohibits arbitration facilitates it.”).
205. See Alison Frankel, Dela. Supreme Court: Companies Can Pick Forum for Shareholders’ Section 11 Claims, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2020, 7:08 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-blueapron/dela-supreme-court-companiescan-pick-forum-for-shareholders-section-11-claims-idUSKBN21540M [https://
perma.cc/RWT5-RM9G] [hereinafter Frankel, Dela. Supreme Court] (explaining the
likely result of a pending case in the U.S. District Court of New Jersey contemplating the inclusion of an arbitration clause in proxy materials following Salzberg); see
also Alison Frankel, N.J. Judge Tosses Suit Testing Legality of Shareholder Arbitration,
REUTERS (July 6, 2021, 5:02 PM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/njjudge-tosses-suit-testing-legality-shareholder-arbitration-2021-07-06/ [https://
perma.cc/4EHG-P74T] (dismissing due to ripeness).
206. See Frankel, Dela. Supreme Court, supra note 204. Additionally, this concern may be unsubstantiated due to grounds in equity and unconscionability, especially if purporting to be included in unilaterally adopted bylaws. See Aggarwal,
Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 415–16 (considering challenges to arbitration
clauses under the FAA and unconscionability and concluding there would likely
have grounds for invalidation of these clauses).
207. See Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 414–15 (explaining that a
fee-shifting provision “with respect to 1933 Act claims is also a possibility”);
DiCiancia, supra note 65, at 1564 (noting “uncertainty still remains as to . . .
whether the prohibition applies to securities class action lawsuits”); see also Booth,
supra note 182, at 339 (noting Salzberg would also support “a bylaw requiring that
claims for collateral damage be litigated as a derivative action in Delaware state
court”). A provision likely to survive a challenge under Salzberg is an FFP restricting filing of 1933 Act claims to a specific federal court. See, e.g., Practical Considerations for Private and Public Company Clients in Light of the Delaware Supreme Court’s
Decision Upholding Federal Forum Provisions, WILSON SONSINI (Mar. 23, 2020), https:/
/www.wsgr.com/en/insights/practical-considerations-for-private-and-public-company-clients-in-light-of-the-delaware-supreme-courts-decision-upholding-federal-forum-provisions.html [https://perma.cc/B4D6-8YMG] (noting that nothing in the
Supreme Court’s analysis would prevent this type of provision); John F. Sylvia, Patrick E. McDonough & Ellen Shapiro, Supreme Court of Delaware Overturns Court of
Chancery, Allowing Corporations To Enact Federal Forum Provisions to Keep Securities Act
Claims In Federal Court, MINTZ, (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.mintz.com/insightscenter/viewpoints/2901/2020-03-20-supreme-court-delaware-overturns-courtchancery-allowing [https://perma.cc/WVR6-TN7A] (suggesting the adoption of
such provisions); see also James L. Hallowell, Mark H. Mixon, Jr. & Andrew Kuntz,
‘Salzberg’ Opens Door to Creativity in the ‘Outer Band’ of ‘Intra-Corporate Affairs’, DEL.
BUS. CT. INSIDER (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/
uploads/2020/04/Hallowell-Mixon-Kuntz-Salzberg-Opens-Door-to-Creativity-inthe-Outer-Band-of-Intra-Corporate-Affairs-Delaware-Business-Court-Insider-04-082020.pdf [https://perma.cc/MAA8-PJVR] (noting same rationale would apply).
In addition, FFPs in bylaws will likely be valid due to implicit acquiescence by stockholders to bylaws. See Boilermakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d
934, 939–40 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[Delaware] Supreme Court has long noted that
bylaws, together with the certificate of incorporation . . . may authorize the board
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Sister States’ Treatment of FFPs following Salzberg

Though Salzberg is influential in the validation of FFPs in corporate
governance documents due to Delaware’s strong influence in state corporate law, it is not binding on courts outside of Delaware’s jurisdiction.208
Accordingly, it remains unsettled how other state courts will address the
use of FFPs.209 The recent cases decided in other state courts demonstrate the likelihood that Delaware’s sister states will continue to enforce
these FFPs, at least for Delaware corporations.
In California, a state traditionally seen as plaintiff friendly, at least
three cases have affirmed the validity of these FFPs.210 All three involved
Delaware corporations either headquartered or having their principal
place of business in California.211 The decisions in these cases point to a
“broad consensus among different California Courts to enforce FFPs” with
reasoning paralleling Salzberg’s.212 Nevertheless, though these cases are
potentially predictive of how courts in other states are likely to treat these
FFPs in the future, “the decisions are not binding precedent even in California nor do they address FFPs for entities incorporated outside of
Delaware.”213
to amend the bylaws’ terms and that stockholders who invest in such corporation
assent to be bound by board-adopted bylaws when they buy stock in those corporations” (citing Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergp., Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del.
1990))); see also In re Dropbox Securities Litigation, Case No. 19-cv-06348-BLF,
2020 WL 6161502 (N.D. Ca. Dec. 4, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss due to FFP
in bylaws).
208. See David A. Edgar, David M. Aceto & Jorgen M. Rehn, Channeling Claims:
The Importance of Considering (and Updating) Exclusive Forum Provisions Now, K&L
GATES (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.klgates.com/Channeling-Claims-The-Importance-of-Considering-And-Updating-Exclusive-Forum-Provisions-Now-11-25-2020
[https://perma.cc/8XSZ-Z6VV] (recommending adoption of FFPs based on the
Delaware endorsement because “many other jurisdictions often follow Delaware’s
lead on corporate law matters”).
209. See Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 133 (Del. 2020) (“Perhaps the
most difficult aspect of this dispute is not with the facial validity of FFPs, but rather,
with the ‘down the road’ question of whether they will be respected and enforced
by our sister states.”).
210. See Gregory A. Markel, Daphne Morduchowitz, Vincent A Sama, Catherine B. Schumaker & John P. Hunt, Legal Update, Dropbox Becomes Third California Superior Court Decision to Enforce Delaware Corporations’ Federal Forum Provisions for
Securities Act Lawsuits, SEYFARTH (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.seyfarth.com/newsinsights/dropbox-becomes-third-california-superior-court-decision-to-enforce-delaware-corporations-federal-forum-provision-for-securities-act-lawsuits.html [https://
perma.cc/8QLG-J2ZS] (“Restoration Robotics effectively upheld [Salzberg’s] holding
. . . . The courts in Uber and Dropbox reached the same conclusion as [Salzberg].”);
see id. (“Restoration Robotics and DropBox are significant in part because the Superior
Court for San Mateo County in the past has been considered a plaintiff friendly
jurisdiction.”).
211. See id.
212. See id. (noting the significance of these cases).
213. Id.; see also Hook v. Casa Systems, Inc., No. 654548/2019, 2021 WL
3884063 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 30, 2021) (from a state court in New York, dismissing
claims based on an FFP in the defendant corporation’s charter).
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Conclusion: Salzberg Will Improve Judicial Economy for Securities
Litigation—Benefiting Both Corporations and Shareholders

Ultimately, it is in the best interest of both corporations and their
shareholders for these FFPs to continue to be enforced because they promote both judicial efficiency for courts and cost efficiency in litigation for
corporations.214 Some critics argue that Salzberg took away a powerful
check on corporations to ensure conformity with regulations, and therefore it was not in the best interest of shareholders.215 This is an incomplete assessment of Salzberg’s down the road effects.216 Rather, the
advantages of allowing corporations to adopt these FFPs far outweigh the
potential disadvantages to stockholders’ enforcement power.217
Parallel federal and state court litigation inflicts a considerable financial burden on corporations, with no accompanying financial benefit to
shareholders.218 Claims filed in state court are able to avoid a lot of the
protections for corporations against frivolous claims and prevent the corporation from consolidating identical claims.219 Thus, by preventing parallel filings and allowing consolidation in federal court, these FFPs reduce
the overall cost to corporations in defending these litigations.220 In turn,
the reduction in overall costs to corporations provides more return for
shareholders.221
Notably, FFPs do not remove shareholders’ ability to sue when their
claim holds merit, but instead specifically preserve this right in federal
214. For discussion on how Salzberg improved judicial efficiency and cost efficient for securities litigation, see infra notes 216–221 and accompanying text.
215. See ROPER, supra note 156, at 2–3 (noting the fear that provisions could
“insulat[e] the corporation and its management from being held accountable for
wrongdoing” and potentially cause “the fairness, transparency, and stability of our
securities markets [to] be severely damaged”).
216. For full description of more down the line effects, see infra notes
218–224 and accompanying text.
217. See Mohsen Manesh, The Corporate Contract and the Internal Affairs Doctrine,
71 AM. U.L. REV. 501, 523 (2021).
218. See id. at 511–12 (explaining how the litigation costs incurred by corporations when there were parallel actions in state and federal court “came without any
attendant benefit to investors, the purported plaintiffs in a section 11 class
action”).
219. See Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 422 (determining that FFPs
are able to “direct litigation to . . . federal courts, where cases will be subject to the
various procedural and substantive rules under the PSLRA and SLUSA that Congress thought desirable for federal securities litigation”).
220. See id. at 422 (“[P]roponents of federal forum provisions have argued
that they may serve a useful role in curbing excessive litigation.”); see also id. at 383
(reporting empirical findings that “suggest[ ] that federal forum provisions may
serve shareholders’ interest by mitigating excessive 1933 Act litigation.”).
221. See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 195 (“FFPs clearly benefit stockholders by
minimizing wasteful multi-jurisdictional litigation over many disputes involving the
corporations they own.”); Manesh, supra note 217, at 523 (“By channeling section
11 claims into federal court, FFPs enabled corporations, and ultimately their shareholders, to avoid the wasteful cost of defending parallel lawsuits in state courts,
while still allowing meritorious claims to proceed in a federal forum.”).
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court.222 It is also inaccurate to state that the corporations that choose to
adopt FFPs are necessarily more likely to be “bad apples.”223 Instead,
these FFPs are necessary to avoid meritless filings wherein the corporation
may be required to settle to avoid compounding costs.224 Ultimately, the
costs saved by blocking these meritless claims will cause more value to be
retained in the corporation for the stockholders.
222. See Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 137 (Del. 2020) (arguing that
FFPs do not violate the balance of the interests of the stakeholders and costs imposed on Delaware entities, because “they allow for litigation of federal Securities
Act claims in a federal court of plaintiff’s choosing, but also allow for consolidation
and coordination of such claims to avoid inefficiencies and unnecessary costs”).
223. See Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 9, at 408 (concluding from its
empirical study that “firms that choose to adopt FFPs may not necessarily be the
‘bad apples,’ but rather firms that are more likely to be targeted by plaintiffs”).
224. See id. (noting that firms “might have to settle just to get rid of lawsuits
that may take place in state courts that have limited expertise and experience in
securities litigation”).
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